Skopos theory:
a retrospective assessment
Andrew Chesterman
[2010a In W. Kallmeyer et al. (eds), Perspektiven
auf Kommunikation. Festschrift für Liisa Tittula zum 60. Geburtstag.
Berlin: SAXA Verlag, 209-225.]
1. Introduction
It is often said, especially by laymen,
that translation does not really have a theory. Not true: it has lots! (Well,
it depends what you want to call a theory; but still...) But at least it does not have a general
theory, right? Translation Studies has produced at best only a mixture of
fragmentary theories. – This claim is not quite true either: we have
several candidates which present themselves as general theories of translation.
One them is skopos theory.
It is now about
a quarter of a century since the publication of Reiß and Vermeer’s classic
work, Grundlegung einer allgemeinen
Translationstheorie (1984), and even longer since the earliest publications
on a functional approach to translation. Skopos theory, as a particular type of
general functional theory, seems fairly well established on the map of
translation studies, and is duly mentioned in all the textbooks. But how well
has it stood the test of time? My aim here is to offer a general retrospective
assessment of the theory, also taking account of some more recent criticism.
2. Axiomatic
assumptions
Any theory rests on basic assumptions that
are not tested within a given research paradigm, but are taken as given,
self-evident, based on common sense and logic. We must start from somewhere,
after all. But of course we can always query these assumptions if we wish,
standing outside the paradigm. Some of them may be only implicit, hidden. But good
theories aim to make all the relevant assumptions as explicit as possible, for
instance as axioms from which the rest of the theoretical claims can be
deduced. Skopos theory is unusual among other theories of translation, in that
it has this form of a deductive, “syntactic” theory based on a small number of
explicit axioms. In the 1984 version, these are called “rules” (Regeln). I give them here in summarized
form (in the original German, from Reiß and Vermeer 1984: 119), followed by some
brief initial explications and comments.
1. Ein Translat
ist skoposbedingt.
2. Ein Translat
ist ein Informationsangebot in einer Zielkultur und –sprache über ein
Informationsangebot in einer Ausgangskultur und –sprache.
3. Ein Translat
bildet ein Informationsangebot nicht-umkehrbar eindeutig ab.
4. Ein Translat
muß in sich kohärent sein.
5. Ein Translate
muß mit dem Ausgangstext kohärent sein.
6. Die angeführten
Regeln sind untereinander in der angegebenen Reihenfolge hierarchisch geordnet
(“verkettet”).
Ad 1: Skopos theory thus assumes that a
translation always has a skopos (a purpose), even though this may not always be
clear (ibid.: 21). This skopos may often differ from that of the source text
(surely a useful point). The skopos is the highest determining factor
influencing the translator’s decisions. Elsewhere (ibid.: 96), the rule is
phrased: “Die Dominante aller Translation is deren Zweck.” The theory assumes
that the skopos is oriented towards to the intended target recipients: all
translations have such a readership; even if you cannot always specify them,
there are always “there” (ibid.: 85). – I will return below to problems
of definition.
Ad 2: The theory assumes that language
is embedded in culture. Translation is seen as a subtype of more general
cultural transfer (Reiß and Vermeer 1984: 13). The “information offer” concept
relates to the underlying theory of communication, whereby a sender “offers”
information to a receiver. This information is assumed by the sender to be “interesting”
to the receiver (ibid.: 76, 103), and, if the communicative act is successful,
it will be interpreted by the receiver in a way that is compatible with the
sender’s intention and does not give rise to a “protest” (ibid.: 67, 106).
Ad 3: Translations are not normally
reversible; and a given source text has many possible translations.
Ad 4: Intratextual coherence is assumed
to exist to the extent that the text makes sense to the receiver, that it is
compatible with the receiver’s cognitive context, as in any form of
communication. Note that rules 4 and 5 have a clear prescriptive form, unlike
the others.
Ad 5: This fidelity rule assumes that
the translation represents the source text, in some way which is relevant to
the skopos. The theory recognizes a range of equivalence types.
Ad 6: This rule is of a different status
from the others, and, as part of a general theory, problematic. We might at
least want to query the order of rules 4 and 5 as being universally valid.
Immediately
after giving this summary, the authors claim that these rules are “probably”
the only general rules of translation
(ibid.: 120). All further development of the theory would then be filling in
more detail, providing rules for the analysis of the target situation,
establishing conditions for the selection of different translation strategies,
and so on (ibid.: 85).
A
last initial comment: at the very beginning of the book, the authors define “theory”,
quite reasonably, thus: “Unter ‘Theorie’ versteht man die Interpretation und
Verknüpfung von ‘Beobachtungsdaten’” (ibid.: vii). This definition nevertheless
seems to be rather at odds with the way they actually present their theory. The
argument of the book does not start with empirical observations or inductive
generalizations, but proceeds deductively. Examples are given to support
claims, but many of them seem to be invented.
In
a later publication, Vermeer (1996: 12f) contextualizes skopos theory
explicitly as a form of action theory. Here too he sets out a number of axioms
(now called, in English, “theses”), as follows, ending at about the point where
the previous list (above) began:
1. All acting
presupposes a “point of departure”, i.e. an actor’s position in space and time,
convictions, theories, etc., including their respective history.
2. All acting is
goal-oriented.
3. From a
variety of possibilities [...]
that action will be chosen which one believes one has the best reasons
for choosing under the prevailing circumstances. The reason(s) may not be conscious
for the actor.
4. Given the
prevailing circumstances, an actor tries to reach the intended goal by what
seem to him the/an optimal way, i.e., for which he believes he has the best
overall reason(s).
5. Translating
is acting, i.e. a goal-oriented procedure carried out in such a way as the
translator deems optimal under the prevailing circumstances.
6. Thesis 5 is a
general thesis valid for all types of translating [including interpreting].
7. In
translating, all potentially pertinent factors (including the source text on
all its levels) are taken into consideration as far as the skopos of translating allows and/or demands.
[Emphasis original]
8. The skopos of
(translational) acting determines the strategy for reaching the intended goal.
One might wonder about the apparent
underlying assumption here that human behaviour is necessarily always rational
– if these axioms are supposed
to be descriptive (on which more below). Another underlying assumption, to
which we shall return, is the assumption of optimality: that the translator
(always) acts in an optimal way.
3. Conceptual
contribution
Quite apart from any other merits, a theory
may contribute new concepts to a field. These may aid theoretical thinking in
general, as well as description and explanation, and may be taken up and
adapted by other theories. New theoretical concepts are interpretive
hypotheses, to be tested pragmatically in use (see further e.g. Chesterman
2008). Two aspects of this potential conceptual contribution will be mentioned
here, beginning with the central concepts themselves.
3.1. Key terms
and conceptual distinctions
Some of the earliest criticism of skopos
theory had to do with some of its definitions, or the lack of them (see Koller
1990, on functional theories more generally; Kelletat 1986; Hebenstreit 2007).
We can also ask whether the relation between the set of terms and the set of
necessary concepts is an appropriate one. Are there too many terms, or too few?
Skopos is said to be a synonym of Zweck (purpose) or Funktion (Reiss and
Vermeer 1984: 96), but “function” itself is not explicitly defined in the same
context. Perhaps it could be glossed as “intended effect”. But: effect on whom?
Intended receivers, or any and all receivers? And intended by whom? Is it only
the client’s intention that counts? What about the source author’s? The
publisher’s? When does an effect begin, and end? What about heterogeneous
effects? How do we actually measure effects? Furthermore, if skopos equals
function, we may wonder why a new term is needed. Confusingly, the German term Funktion is used in several senses,
including the mathematical one. Two of these senses do indicate an interesting
distinction: “external function” is said to denote the translator’s general
objective of making a living, whereas “internal function” refers to the skopos
of a given translation (or translation process) (ibid.: 4). This external
function seems very close to the term telos
proposed in Chesterman and Baker (2008), to describe a translator’s ideological
motivation for working as a translator, either generally as a career or on some
specific, perhaps chosen, assignment.
Later,
Vermeer (1996: 7-8) seeks to distinguish three related concepts as follows: the
intention is what the client wants to
do; the skopos is what the
translation is for; and the function
is the “text purpose as inferred, ascribed by recipient”. But there remain
problems here. Are these distinctions necessary? When might an intention clash
with a skopos? Function, in
particular, remains an unclear concept. Recipients are not a homogeneous set,
and may well ascribe very different functions. Even a model reader may react
differently on different occasions. And besides, actual reception should surely
be distinguished from intended function. Both intentions and functions may be
virtually impossible to access, particularly if the translations studied are
distant in time or space. – The conceptual and terminological confusion
here has not been resolved (see e.g. Nord 1997: 27f; Sunwoo 2007).
Another
problematic term is that of coherence,
used both to refer to the similarity relation of equivalence between source and
target, and to the intratextual interpretability of the translation itself.
These seem very different concepts, and one wonders why the theory uses the
same term. Since we already have “equivalence”, and this term is used in skopos
theory too, why do we need a new term? We also already have “similarity”, if
something looser than “equivalence” is wanted.
A
translation is defined in the second axiom as an offer of information about a source text (which is itself another
such offer, about something else). This interpretation of the relation between
source and target is much weaker than any notion of equivalence, weaker even
than relevant similarity (although Reiss and Vermeer do refer occasionally to
the offer as being a “simulating” one, e.g. p. 80, 105). It does not appear to
constrain the “offer” in any way, except insofar as the offer is assumed to be “interesting”
to the receivers and is “coherent” with the source text. Here again we can ask:
does this term really earn its place?
Regarding the
German term Translation itself, we
can appreciate the way in which skopos theory (following a German tradition in
Translation Studies) uses this to cover both written and oral translation: this
is a neat solution we have not managed to imitate in English, and which has
subsequently been widely accepted. There will, however, always be argument
about the appropriate extension of the term. Kelletat (1986) and Koller (1990)
think the skopos notion of translation is too broad because of the way it
downgrades the importance of the source text and thus allows very free
translations, adaptations etc., within the concept. Kelletat (1986: 15) even
suggests the Reiss/Vermeer definition would include the whole of Latin
literature! In my view, on the contrary, it is too narrow, if it is taken to
exclude non-optimal translations.
The
theory’s use of the term “adequacy” (Adäquatheit)
also merits a comment. The term was already familiar from other approaches,
particularly Toury’s (e.g. 1980). But skopos theory defines it differently, not
as a retrospective relation of closeness between target and source but as a
prospective one between the translation, the source text and the skopos (Reiss and Vermeer 1984: 139). This skopos-sense of
adequacy is so easily confused with the Toury-sense that scholars now either
have to specify which sense is intended or give up using the term altogether.
It is risky to give a new sense to an already established term.
Skopos
theory, like other functional approaches, has also contributed to a more
differentiated conceptualization of the agents involved in the translation
process. Instead of simply having a sender and a receiver, we have learned to
distinguish between writer, client, translator, publisher, recipient, addressee
and so on. In this sense, skopos theory has helped to shift the discipline
towards a more sociological approach.
3.2. Underlying metaphorical structure
A good theory’s concepts do not exist in
isolation, but in a network of relations. This network may be more or less
consistent in terms of its metaphorical structure. Martín de León (2008) has
recently drawn attention to some interesting problems in the underlying
metaphorical conceptualization of skopos theory. She argues that the theory
combines two different metaphors: TRANSFER and TARGET. This suggests a lack of
conceptual consistency, insofar as the metaphors are incompatible.
The TRANSFER
metaphor describes the movement of an object from A to B, and assumes that the
object (or some essence of it) does not change en route. This means assuming
some kind of equivalence, of course. As an underlying metaphor for translation
(visible in the etymology of this word), it normally needs to reify some notion
of meaning (referred to as the message in Holz-Mänttäri 1984). The client’s
intention might also be regarded as an “object” that is to be preserved.
However, the view of a translation as merely an “offer of information” about
the source text appears to go against the TRANSFER metaphor.
The theory’s
notion of intertextual coherence also relates to this metaphor, albeit loosely.
But how valid is this assumption that meaning is “there” in the text? Several
contemporary models of cognition would argue that meaning always emerges via a
process of interpretation, a process which depends on multiple variables and is
not completely predictable (see e.g. Risku 2002). – In my view, both
these positions are overstated. Surely some meanings are more obviously,
objectively “there” in a text, while others are much less so and are open to
interpretive variation. If no meanings were objectivizable at all, there would
be no work for terminologists and no-one would dare to step into a plane.
The TARGET
metaphor on the other hand describes a process from a source along a path to a
goal. It does not assume an unchanged, reified message. It implies that the
translator can participate in constructing the meaning of the message and thus
highlights notions of intentionality and rationality. Skopos theory stresses
the expertise and responsibility of the translator to select what needs to be
translated and to translate it in the most appropriate manner. But this metaphor
also prompts questions. Suppose a given process or action does not have a
single goal but multiple ones, perhaps regarding heterogeneous receivers? And
where actually is a goal located? Strictly speaking, the goal is not in the
text but in the mind of the initiating agent, for whom the translation is
merely a means to achieve a goal or goals. Further: where in the theory is
there any space for an assessment of the goals themselves? Is it really enough
to say that any end justifies the means? – We will take up the ethical
dimension of this argument below.
4.
Ontological status of the theory
Perhaps the most debated problem of skopos
theory has been its unclear ontological status. Does it aim to be a descriptive
theory (of what is) or a prescriptive
one (of what should be)? Does it
describe a real world or an ideal, optimal one?
This
ambiguous status is already apparent in its axioms: axioms four and five are
openly prescriptive, but the others are not. Reiss and Vermeeer say that there
is no such thing as “the best” translation for a given source text. “Es gibt
nur das Streben nach Optimierung unter den jeweils gegebenen aktuellen
Bedingungen” (1984: 113). – This is an interesting formulation. The “es
gibt” looks like an existential, descriptive claim: it is a fact that
translators strive, that they do their best. Well, how valid is this fact? We
could reply that good translators do indeed do their best, most of the time, but
surely there must also be many translators who merely do the minimum, at least
sometimes. Professionals must often satisfice, after all. And there are many
bad translators, of course (if a translator is anyone who does a translation,
as a general theory should surely assume).
It
seems to me to be clear that skopos theory is essentially prescriptive,
although it has some descriptive assumptions. It aims to describe how good translators, expert professionals,
work; what good translations are like. It describes an ideal world (see also
Chesterman 1998). Vermeer has acknowledged this (Chesterman 2001), saying that
the theory seeks to describe optimal cases. Elsewhere, however, he also seems
to suggest that functional theories in general are both descriptive and
prescriptive:
Skopos theory is
meant to be a functional theoretical general theory covering process, product
and, as the name says, function both of production and reception. As a
functional theory it does not strictly distinguish between descriptive and
(didactic) prescription. (Vermeer 1996: 26n)
Although the term “functional” remains
problematic, I find this claim curious. Consider for instance the analysis of
the reception of translations in a given culture in a given period. This would
be an analysis of how the translations “functioned” in the target culture (data
might include all kinds of responses, critical reviews, library loans, size and
number of editions published, allusions to the translations in other writings,
use of the translations as source texts for further translations, or as
literary influences; sales of commercial products advertised by the
translations; changes in the social, political, religious or ideological
conditions; and so on). The analysis would not need to be prescriptive in any
way. Even if the analysis compared the reception with the inferred intentions
of different clients, this would not imply a prescriptive approach.
On
the other hand, there is one obvious way in which prescriptive claims can be
viewed descriptively, and that is by formulating them as predictive hypotheses,
as argued in Chesterman (1999). Vermeer actually does precisely this at one
point (1996: 31): “if you translate in such and such a way then y will happen”.
Such predictions can then be tested in the normal way, and the results can be
generalized in the form of guidelines which, if followed, are reliably assumed
to lead to translations which do not give rise to negative feedback (“Protest”
in skopos-theoretical terms). This, of course, is precisely what translator
training courses teach. It is also what skopos theory aims to do. If you keep
the skopos in mind, and translate accordingly, the result will be better than
if you neglect the skopos.
5. Empirical
status of the theory
As presented, skopos theory is not founded
on a search for empirical regularities. This point has been made by many
critics (e.g. Koller 1995: 215). We can nevertheless consider how its various
assumptions and claims might be tested empirically. It is striking that very
little such testing has actually been done. What kind of evidence would falsify
or weaken its claims? I will first consider the theory’s descriptive adequacy,
then comment on its explanatory adequacy and possible testable consequences.
5.1.
Descriptive adequacy
Axioms two and three in the original list
above are descriptive. Axiom two, on translation as an offer of information, is
definitional. It is an interpretive hypothesis, which can be glossed something
like this: ‘in this theory, we claim that a translation is usefully interpreted
as ...’. As such, the claim is not falsifiable, but is testable pragmatically,
i.e. in use (see further Chesterman 2008). Has this interpretation been widely
adopted and led to further hypotheses? Not notably, it seems. On the contrary,
it has aroused some criticism, as it seems to allow the concept of translation
to expand too far (e.g. Kelletat 1986).
Axiom
three states that translations are not reversible. This claim can certainly be
tested empirically, via back-translation. In my view, the claim is too extreme.
It would surely be more accurate to say that the smaller the unit of
translation, the more reversible it is; that in cases of standardized
translations – e.g. in multilingual
glossaries of special fields or in the names of institutions, or in many
idioms and proverbs, in numbers, etc. – reversibility may well be the
norm. In other words, the claim needs to be restricted, made subject to other
conditional factors such as size of translation unit, text type, skopos, and so
on.
There
have been a few empirical studies recently which question some of the other
basic assumptions of skopos theory. Koskinen (2008) examines the working
conditions of EU translators. One of her findings is that in many cases, EU
translations that are not intended for the general public are not directed at a
target culture at all, but are oriented by the needs of the source institution
(99-100). This goes against the skopos theory assumption that a translation
should have optimal functionality for target culture addressees. However, this
type of EU case is not evidence against the idea that a translation is
primarily determined by its skopos.
Here, the skopos is simply not a target-oriented one. Interestingly,
Koskinen points out that the special requirements of this kind of translation
are experienced as particularly problematic by translators who have been
trained in a functional approach: their translation brief seems to conflict
with the target-oriented way in which they have been trained to think.
Furthermore,
many professional translators do not work as autonomous individuals but as
members of a team of experts, including terminologists, subject specialists,
revisers, copyeditors and so on. Such conditions do not always support the
skopos theory assumption that it is the translator who ultimately decides how
to translate, as the expert. (“Er entscheidet letzten Endes, ob, was, wie übersetzt/gedolmetscht
wird.” Reiß and Vermeer 1984: 87.) One recent study illustrates this well:
Nordman (2009) examines the complex process of Finnish-Swedish translation in
the bilingual Finnish Parliament, and highlights interesting disagreements
between the translator’s preferences and those of revisers or legal experts,
and how these are resolved. The translators and revisers she studied seem to
have different norm priorities. It is not always the translator’s views that
prevail.
Even in some
literary translation the priority of the translator’s expertise has been
questioned. In a questionnaire study dealing with poetry translation, Flynn
(2004) queries the status of some of the factors which skopos theory assumes,
including that of the dominance of the translator’s own expertise. Flynn found
that the situational factors affecting the final form of the translation are
more like sites of confrontation between the various agents involved, including
publishers and proof-readers as well as translators. The translator does not
necessarily always have the final say. Flynn’s results admittedly concern a particular
type of translation only, in a particular (Irish) context; but again, we can
point out that a general theory should be able to cope with all types.
As
another example of evidence against the assumption that it is the expert
translator who makes the final decisions I cite an ongoing PhD project by Julia
Lambertini Andreotti at Tarragona. She is a qualified court interpreter working
with Spanish and English in California. The ethical code there requires that
interpreters make no alteration to the register of the legal jargon as they
translate. But since many of the clients are not well educated, they simply do
not understand the legal terminology, and so do not understand what they are
asked. As communication experts, the interpreters naturally wish to adapt the
register so that the clients can understand, but this is not allowed. The
interpreters are simply not permitted to act as skopos theory assumes.
One might argue
that all such examples are cases where a translator is forced to act under duress,
against the council of his own expertise, and thus in non-optimal conditions.
They would thus fall outside the scope of skopos theory. Reiß and Vermeer
explicitly exclude instances of “Translation unter Zwang” (1984: 101). –
But there are multiple kinds and grades of duress, including unrealistic deadlines, legal
constraints etc., which characterize much real-world translation and
interpreting. Indeed, if there are in fact more non-optimal cases than optimal
ones, skopos theory itself would deal only with special cases – surely
not the intention of the skopos theorists. A general theory should be general
enough to encompass all cases.
From
another point of view, note should be taken of studies on how translators
perform under time pressure (e.g. Hansen 2002). These studies suggest that when
professional experts work under unusual time pressure, they tend not to waste
time pondering about the skopos or the target audience but simply stay on the
surface of the text, translating fairly literally, without reformulations or
other major shifts which might actually be appropriate for the readership. Here
again we have professionals working in a non-optimal situation, without
sufficient time for normal working procedures. Under these conditions, the
skopos assumptions seem not to represent what actually happens.
Research such as
these studies underlines the way in which skopos theory relates more to an
ideal, optimal world than to the real and often suboptimal world of everyday
translation. In this sense, some of the general descriptive claims and
assumptions of the theory can easily be falsified, or forced into more
conditioned formulations – if they are supposed indeed to apply to all
translation, not just optimal translation done in optimal working conditions. And
what about the undeniable existence of a great many really bad translations?
These are nonetheless also translations, of a kind; but they are completely
excluded from skopos theory. From the point of view of descriptive adequacy,
then, the theory is inadequate. But if it is taken as a prescriptive theory, of
course, this is not a valid criticism.
5.2.
Explanatory adequacy
The first axiom (in the German list above)
is a causal one. From the point of view of the production of a translation, it
states that the skopos is the most important conditioning factor. This has
obvious prescriptive relevance. But retrospectively, as an answer to the
question “why is this translation like this?”, the axiom formulates a causal
explanation. The most important reason why a translation (or, modified: an
optimal translation) is as it is, is its skopos. This claim gives rise to
several points.
Implied
in the axiom is the assumption that every translation has a skopos in the first place. Is this assumption testable? Could
we in principle refute the claim by finding a translation that does not have a
skopos? Perhaps not. Skopos theorists would say that the skopos is always
already there, even if not well defined or even definable. Some scholars (e.g.
Kohlmayer 1988) have argued that literary translations do not have a skopos; it
is certainly not easy to be precise about the skopoi of literary texts.
The
theory does not assume that the skopos is the only cause, merely that it is the
dominant one. How might this dominance be measured? What other causes might be
relevant? One might counter-argue that under some conditions the skopos
dominates, under other conditions some other cause (perhaps these other
conditions would be non-optimal ones?). Kelletat (1986) points out that Reiß
and Vermeer fail to show how different translation traditions, as well as
different skopoi, are themselves affected by historical conditions.
Recall
Aristotle’s four causes: the skopos cause corresponds to his “final”,
teleological one. It has been argued (e.g. by Pym 1998: 148f) that skopos
theory overvalues this teleological cause at the expense of the others. The
skopos does take account also of Aristotle’s formal cause (the target-culture
norms), but what about the efficient cause (the mind and body of the translator
plus computer etc.) or the material cause (the source text, perhaps also the
constraints of the target language itself)? Pym argues that by imputing purpose
to a text, skopos theory neglects the socially determined individuals who are actually
doing the translation. Skopos theory also avoids the problem situation in which
client and translator differ about the skopos, or where there might be a
conflict of loyalty. True, Nord’s version of skopos theory (Nord [1988] 1991
and later versions) gives more weight to the material cause by focusing
strongly on the analysis of the source text. But Vermeer does not agree with
Nord’s introduction of the notion of loyalty (see further below).
It
is often pointed out in textbooks that skopos theory helped to dethrone the
source text as the dominating causal factor determining the form of a
translation. It has now placed the skopos on the vacant throne. But perhaps we
would achieve greater explanatory adequacy, more nuanced explanations, if we
recognized a range of explanatory variables including norms, personal
preferences, special situational constraints and so on, all of which impinge on
the translators decisions (see e.g. Brownlie 2003). The relative strength of
the different variables in a given case would then depend on the circumstances.
This would also allow for non-optimal working conditions, and indeed
non-optimal translators. Any generalization about the overall dominance of one independent
variable or another could only be based on a wide range of comparative
empirical studies.
5.3. Testable
consequences
A deductive theory such as skopos theory,
if it claims to be empirical, should also generate hypotheses that can be
tested and potentially falsified. The theoretical claims should have testable
consequences. Curiously, the theory does not seem to have been very productive
in this respect. One reason may be the difficulty of operationalizing its
central concepts and claims.
One
predictive hypothesis that does arise very naturally from the theory’s premises
is that if the skopos is different, the translation will be different. This can
easily be tested: a given source text is translated twice, each time with a
different skopos. Nordberg (2003) studied precisely this situation, but focused
on differences between professionals and non-professionals rather than
skopos-determined differences.
Other
hypotheses can be proposed, which (as far as I am aware) have not been
explicitly tested.
–
If a translation is deemed bad, the main reason (a reason?) will be that it does not meet the skopos. (Also obvious,
surely.)
–
The more the translator pays attention to the skopos, the better the
translation will be. (Another obvious one.)
–
Skopos-type correlates more closely than source-text type with
equivalence-type. This one would be more interesting. It would test the
relative causal force of skopos vs source text-type on the source-target
relation. But there is a problem here. We have typologies of text types, and
typologies of equivalence, but, surprisingly, no generally accepted typology of
skopoi. Reiß and Vermeer give random examples, but no systematic typology.
Would such a typology necessarily
be culture-bound and thus not part of a general theory? Surely not, at least no
more than other typologies used in translation research. Prunč (1997a)
proposes seven prototype classes, but these are in fact classes of
translations, not skopos types. They range from non-translation via
pseudotranslation to homologous, analogous, dialogic (involving more
interpretation) and triadic (intervening, e.g. feminist) to diascopic
translation (gist translation, commentary). Nord (1997) proposes two basic “translation
functions”, documentary and instrumental; but here too we are dealing with
types of translation rather than skopoi.
In a different
article, Prunč (1997b) makes a useful distinction between implicit and
explicit skopos. The implicit skopos is defined as the lowest common
denominator, the default skopos compatible with the current translation norms
and the prevailing translation tradition. The explicit skopos then states,
where necessary, any divergence from the implicit skopos. But no typology of
explicit skopoi is offered here.
Wagner (in
Chesterman and Wagner 2002: 45) does offer one specific skopos typology, for
use in the EU. These are:
For
information, not for publication
For
publication [a very broad
category]
For
advertising and marketing
For
use as a legal document
For
text scanning and abstracting
The
big gap is the lack of research on how a given skopos or skopos type might
actually correlate with given translation strategies or techniques. Even within
given language pairs, this would be interesting and useful. Reiss and Vermeer
(1984: 85) say that a “complete” translation theory would give “rules” for the
analysis of the target recipient situation and how this then conditions the
translation strategy. But skopos-based research has not developed much in this
direction. One wonders why. (For a recent attempt to operationalize the skopos
concept, see Sunwoo 2007.) We look in vain for testable hypotheses of the form:
if the skopos is (type) X, professional translators tend to choose general
strategies ABC. Or: in the case of translations from language S to language T
(under conditions PQR), translators tend to realize skopos-determined strategy
A as techniques / translation solutions DEF.
6. The ethical
dimension
Partly in order to counter criticisms that
skopos theory is too target-oriented and underestimates the value of the source
text, Nord (e.g. 1997: 123f) introduced the concept of loyalty, which is
defined as meaning loyalty to all the people concerned on both side of the
communication exchange, including the source author and sender. Vermeer does
not like this development, as he thinks it brings in an unwanted ethical
dimension. A scientific theory is value-free, he argues.
It has been
argued that translation involves an ethical aspect. However, I amof the opinion
that ethics must not be mixed up with general theoretical considerations about
other subjects. Science should be value-free (wertfrei). (Vermeer 1996: 107)
Toury apparently agrees (1995: 25).
However, I think
this position is untenable. In a classic article, Rudner (1953) showed that
science can never be value-free. Value judgements are made all the time: in
selecting “interesting” research problems (i.e. those that have value...),
evaluating the evidence and counter-evidence for hypotheses, prioritizing
research goals, and so on. Skopos theory highlights the expertise of the
translating agent, who makes decisions. It seems to me that any such theory
must include an ethical dimension, at least insofar as ethical issues influence
the agent’s decisions. (See also Martín de León 2008.) Furthermore, one could
argue that a functional theory of translation should also cover the possible
general ends which translations serve, their ultimate functions, as it were:
some translations are surely more worth doing than others, for instance, not in
terms of pay but in terms of the ethical value of the end product (cf.
voluntary, activist translation, for example). It is all very well to say that
if we want X we should do A (rather than B, for instance); and we can of course
test this hypothesis, checking to see whether A or B is a better means to
attain X. The only criterion here seems to be that of effectiveness. But
suppose we ask who wants X? And for
what reasons? For what further end is X itself a means? And who does not want X?
The lack of this
dimension in skopos theory, where any end is apparently as good as any other,
has led to the theory being associated with a kind of robotic, unthinking
translation process, which dehumanizes the translator. Baker (in Chesterman and
Baker 2008: 21-22) puts this view as follows:
We soon configure
something like skopos theory as a narrative in our minds: the theory evokes
(for me at any rate) an industrialized, affluent society populated by clients
and highly professional translators who belong to the same ‘world’ as their
clients, who are focused on professionalism and making a good living, and who
are highly trained, confident young men and women. These professional
translators and interpreters go about their work in a conflict-free environment
and live happily ever after. They do not get thrown into Guantánamo or shot at
in Iraq, and they do not end up on the border of Kosovo and Albania in the
middle of a nasty war, where they would have to decide whether or not to fulfil
their commission at the expense of treating potential victims with compassion
and respect.
Prunč (1997b) seeks to counter this
criticism that the skopos view of translation risks being interpreted as
totalitarian. He stresses how skopos theory can account for cooperation between
agents, and expands the loyalty concept to include the translator’s loyalty to
him/herself.
Perhaps
Vermeer is equating value-freedom with rationality? Rudner concluded that
value-freedom is often confused with objectivity. He argued:
What is being
proposed here is that objectivity for science lies at least in becoming precise
about what value judgments are being and have been made in a given inquiry
– and even, to put it in its most challenging form, what value decisions
ought to be made; in short that a science of ethics is a necessary requirement
if science’s progress towards objectivity is to be continuous. ([1953] 1998:
497)
7. The
competition?
In assessing a theory (or indeed a
hypothesis) one also compares it to competing theories. The closest competitor
to skopos theory is Justa Holz-Mänttäri’s theory of translational action
(1984). Indeed, this is so close, albeit with a different terminology, that
they are often considered to be variants of the same framework (Vermeer 1996:
61f). Some of the criticism of skopos theory has also been directed at Holz-Mänttäri’s
work (e.g. Koller 1990).
A
more interesting comparison might be made with relevance theory, in its
application to translation (starting with Gutt 1991). A detailed analysis would
take up more space than is available here, so a few comments must suffice.
In
their discussion of the notion of the offer of information, Reiß and Vermeer (1984: 76, 103) write
that this “offer” is assumed by the sender to be “interesting” to the receiver.
I.e. the sender thinks that the information contains something that is “new” to
the receiver, something that will have some effect, which will somehow change
the existing state of affairs in the receiver’s world. – This formulation
suggests the central concept of relevance, as understood in relevance theory.
It would seem that skopos theory sees itself as being much broader than relevance
theory, including relevance-theoretical insights and much more (Vermeer 1996:
65-68).
Relevance
theory clearly aims to be descriptive and indeed explanatory, not prescriptive.
But there does seem to be a conceptual overlap, perhaps more than Vermeer seems
to accept (see Vermeer 1996: 47f, and his comments in Chesterman 2001). Both
theories assume that human action is rational, and both give importance to the
receiver’s side. The two theories differ in the extension of their object of
study: relevance theory excludes very free translations, and so-called
multilingual descriptions, which skopos theory would include (Vermeer 1996:
63). Skopos theory also allows a deliberate change of skopos from that of the
source text, which would seem to be excluded by Gutt’s application of relevance
theory.
8. Concluding
remarks
Skopos theory has proved itself to be
pedagogically invaluable, as a prescriptive theory; I cannot imagine training
translators without using the idea of the skopos. But as an empirical theory
seeking to describe and explain translation phenomena in the real world, it is
weak, precisely because it relies on an optimal set of working conditions with
optimally competent translators. One of the most serious problems in the real
translation world, however, is the prevalence of poor translations, coupled
with poor working conditions and low pay. These issues are not addressed by
skopos theory.
In
terms of its productivity, the theory has been somewhat disappointing. It has
not generated a substantial body of research proposing and testing new
hypotheses derived from the theory, nor significally developed its conceptual
apparatus. True, it has been expounded in numerous textbooks, and applied in
numerous training programmes and notably in translation criticism (e.g. Ammann
1990). It has succeeded in giving some theoretical weight to an intuitively
sensible idea – that translators should consider the purpose of
their translations – and certainly helped to shift the focus of
theoretical thinking away from equivalence towards other relevant factors and
agents which affect the translation process. It has thus helped, perhaps
paradoxically, to make translation theory more realistic. And it has prompted
some of us to ponder more deeply what we mean by a theory.
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